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MARRIAGE EQUALITY IN CALIFORNIA:
LEGAL AND POLITICAL PROSPECTS*
Kenneth W. Starr, Shannon Price Minter,
John C. Eastman & David C. Codell
California has been one of the most active battlegrounds in the
same-sex marriage debate. The fight began in earnest in 2000, when
the state's voters passed Proposition 22, which states that "[only]
marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in
California."1 Four years later, following the legalization of gay
marriage in Massachusetts, San Francisco began issuing marriage
licenses to same-sex couples, a move that was quickly rebuked by
the California Supreme Court. And in September 2005, the
California Legislature became the first state legislature in the nation
to approve marriages by same-sex couples without court order.
Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger ultimately vetoed the bill on the
basis of Proposition 22 and because of the pendency of state-court
litigation challenging Proposition 22. Now, the California Supreme
Court is considering whether Proposition 22 and a pre-existing
California statute restricting marriage to different-sex couples'
violate the state constitution's guarantee of equal protection under
the law.
* On February 28, 2007, the Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, American
Constitution Society for Law and Policy, Federalist Society, and the University of Southern
California Annenberg Knight Chair in Media and Religion convened a distinguished panel of
experts to discuss an upcoming California Supreme Court case concerning same-sex marriage and
other legal issues, as well as the political prospects for same-sex marriage in California and
around the nation. The event was moderated by Dean A. Reuter, Director of Practice Groups,
The Federalist Society. The speakers included The Honorable Kenneth W. Starr, Shannon Price
Minter, John C. Eastman, and David C. Codell. This transcript has been edited for clarity,
spelling, and grammar by Andrea Useem and the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review.
t The Honorable Kenneth W. Starr, Duane and Kelly Roberts Dean and Professor of Law,
Pepperdine University School of Law; Shannon Price Minter, Legal Director, The National
Center for Lesbian Rights; John C. Eastman, Dean and Donald P. Kennedy Chair in Law,
Chapman University Law School; and David C. Codell, Law Office of David C. Codell.
1. CAL. FAM. CODE § 308.5 (West 2007).
2. Id. § 300.
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DEAN A. REUTER: Good afternoon, everyone. My name is Dean
Reuter, and I am the Practice Groups Director for the Federalist
Society in Washington D.C. It's my pleasure to welcome you all
here today. Thanks for coming. It's great to see so many folks here
in the audience, including Judges Waddington, Kozinski, Smith, and
Ridgely, and Manny Klausner from the Reason Foundation. I want
to thank the Libertarian Law Council for helping us to promote this
event. They've done a great job.
Before we begin, I also want to thank several organizations that
have acted as our co-sponsors. In addition to the Federalist Society,
its religious liberties practice group, and its Los Angeles lawyers
chapter, the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, the American
Constitution Society and the USC Annenberg Knight Chair in Media
and Religion have co-sponsored this event. There are several indivi-
duals at each of those organizations who have helped put this event
together, and I'd like to thank each of them, but I fear my remarks
would begin to resemble an Academy Awards acceptance speech-
(laughter)-and that I'd be forced to leave the stage.
Our topic today is gay marriage, or same-sex marriage, or homo-
sexual marriage sometimes with "marriage" in quotes, depending on
who you talk to. In my experience, when you're dealing with an
issue on which the folks most intimately involved in it can't agree on
how to name it, you're in for a lively debate and that's what we
expect today.
This is a topic being discussed nationally and state by state. It's
being litigated here in California, and each of our panelists is
involved in some way with that litigation. We are going to focus on
the California case and broaden the debate from there.
First, some background on the case for those who might not be
familiar with it. It's a little complex, and I hope I get it right. In
2004, six cases were filed in trial courts. They were coordinated,
which I take it is the California term for consolidated, and hearings
were held. The trial court held that the relevant part of the California
Family Code,3 which did not allow same-sex couples to marry,
violated the California Constitution's equal protection guarantee.4 It
held that there was no rational basis for that section of the code, and
3. CAL. FAM. CODE § 300 (West 2007).
4. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7(a).
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that the code discriminated based on sex, and that it violated a
fundamental right to marry without serving a compelling state
interest. The state appealed from that decision and the case was then
heard in the Court of Appeal, First Appellate District.
In October 2005, that court reversed and held that there was no
violation of the equal protection, due process, privacy or free
expression guarantees of the California constitution. A petition for
rehearing in that court was denied, and subsequently a petition for
review was filed in the California Supreme Court. It was granted
and that's where we are today.
Our format today will be as follows: The four panelists will
make initial remarks of about eight to ten minutes, and then we're
going to have questions from the floor. I'm going to introduce our
panelists briefly, in the order they're going to speak, and then we'll
get started.
Our first speaker is Shannon Price Minter. Shannon is the Legal
Director for the National Center for Lesbian Rights. He's been
involved in cases in California and across the country. Our second
speaker is the Honorable Kenneth W. Starr; Judge Starr is Dean and
Professor of Law at Pepperdine University School of Law, and he's
also Of Counsel at Kirkland & Ellis. Our third speaker is David
Codell. He is an attorney focused on entertainment, commercial and
constitutional litigation, and he's been involved in several important
civil rights cases in his career. Last but not least, we will conclude
with Dr. John Eastman. He is a Professor of Law and Associate
Dean at Chapman Law School. He's also a director of the Claremont
Institute Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence. We're happy to
have every one of them here today, and we look forward to a great
debate. With that, if you could start us off, Mr. Minter.
SHANNON PRICE MINTER: Thank you so much. I want to thank the
Federalist Society and the American Constitutional Society as well
as our host, the Pew Forum, for this truly remarkable opportunity.
My colleague, Mr. Codell, and I represent same-sex couples who are
seeking the right to marry in a case that is currently before the
California Supreme Court; Judge Starr and Professor Eastman have
weighed in on the other side of that case. Despite appearances,
however, this ultimately is not a partisan issue; it is not an issue
about conservative versus liberal views. Some of the most persua-
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sive voices supporting marriage for same-sex couples are those of
conservatives such as David Brooks and Andrew Sullivan. Many of
the judges who have ruled in favor of same-sex couples have been
Republican appointees. And if I can speak personally just for a
moment, my parents, who are arch-conservative Texas Repub-
licans-(laughter)-have over time come to embrace full equality for
lesbian and gay couples including marriage.
In short this is not an issue that lends itself to simple political or
ideological labels. It is ultimately a human issue. The reality, as we
know from the most recent federal census, is that more than 100,000
same-sex couples live in California. That's more than in any other
state. Those couples live in every single county in this state, and we
know that more than 70,000 children in California have lesbian and
gay parents. The question is: How do we deal with this reality?
These are real families with real children. How should the law
respond?
That's a question we all collectively have the responsibility to
answer. Very often, however, those who oppose marriage for same-
sex couples ignore this human reality. We hear many arguments
about promoting a certain version of the so-called optimal family and
arguments about channeling heterosexual procreation into marriage,
but meanwhile, the simple reality is there are hundreds of thousands
of same-sex couples, and many of them are raising children.
Excluding gay people from marriage will hurt those families, but it
won't cause them to disappear, and it certainly won't change the fact
that these children do have lesbian and gay parents.
In representing these families before the California courts, Mr.
Codell and I have argued that the state is constitutionally required to
treat these families equally. We believe this is required by the equal
protection clause of our state constitution, which prohibits govern-
ment discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender, and any
type of government discrimination that lacks a rational basis. It's
also required by the privacy clause of our state constitution, which
has long been held to protect the right to marry.
Unlike the federal Constitution, the California Constitution
expressly identifies privacy as an inalienable right, and the voters in
this state amended our state constitution in 1972 for that very pur-
pose. Under our state privacy clause, the California Supreme Court
has looked not only to history and tradition, but also to evolving laws
1212
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and policies, changing social conditions and, generally, our increased
appreciation for the importance of protecting human dignity for all
people. For these reasons as well as others, we believe that Califor-
nia's current marriage law violates the California Constitution. More
importantly, we hope the California Supreme Court will see it that
way as well.
In the meantime, however, there is one point on which all parties
in this case agree, and that is the importance of marriage. In 1948,
the California Supreme Court became the first in the country to strike
down laws that bar interracial marriage. The Court held in that case
that marriage is a "basic civil right."5  The U.S. Supreme Court
likewise has described marriage as a "vital personal right," and one
that is "essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness."6
Some cultures, of course, arrange marriages, and, in a number of
countries, laws that restrict the right to marry based on religion or
cast or creed are taken for granted and accepted. In our
constitutional system, however, the very essence of the right to
marry, as the California Supreme Court has held, is the "freedom to
join in marriage with the person of one's choice."7 As Judge Kramer
explained at the trial court, the court was not saying therefore anyone
can marry anyone, but rather the starting point is that one can choose
who to marry and that choice cannot be limited by the state unless
there is a legitimate governmental reason for doing so. Judge
Kramer went on to hold that there is no legitimate reason in this case.
One of the couples in the case, Del Martin and Phyllis Lyon, has
been together for more than 54 years. They're now both in their 80s.
Because they're not able to marry, they're much more vulnerable
than their heterosexual counterparts. For one thing, every year they
pay significantly more taxes than they would if they were married,
and that's been true now for more than 50 years. When one of them
dies, the other will not be eligible for [the] Social Security benefits
[of the deceased partner]. If either has to go into a nursing home or
long-term care, the other will almost certainly lose their family
home, which would not be the case if they were a married couple.
The federal Office of General Accounting has identified more than
5. Perez v. Sharp, 198 P.2d 17, 19 (Cal. 1948).
6. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
7. Perez, 198 P.2d at 21.
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1,100 rights and benefits that are available only to married people.8
Despite their five-plus decades of devotion to one another, Del
Martin and Phyllis Lyon are not entitled to any of those. While
they're registered as domestic partners in the state of California, the
minute they set foot outside of this state, they'll be treated as legal
strangers. Other states don't have any clear obligation to recognize
California domestic partnerships, and most have no idea what a
"domestic partnership" is.
For heterosexual people who are married, it's very difficult,
perhaps impossible, to imagine what it must be like to be barred by
law from being able to marry your spouse of 50 years and thus have
no way to ensure your relationship with your spouse or your children
will be protected, honored or recognized, particularly in moments of
illness or other crises. The harms inflicted on lesbian and gay
couples by being excluded from marriage are very real, and there is
no substitute for marriage. While domestic partnership provides
some protection, it falls short of genuine equality by any reasonable
measure.
In closing, I want to respond quickly to two arguments we often
hear on the other side. The first is that marriage is not just an
individual right, but that it also serves important social purposes.
Judge Starr is fond of quoting a passage from the conservative
philosopher Edmund Burke-it's also one of my favorites, quite
inspiring. Dean Starr has written: "Marriage and family are indeed
the quintessential little platoon that Edmund Burke famously
celebrated as the first principle of public affections, the first link in a
series by which we proceed toward a love of country and to
mankind."9  It's a terrible mistake, however, to think the little
platoons headed by same-sex couples are any less worthy or capable
of achieving those very noble purposes than any other. Society
benefits when couples marry and that is true regardless of their
sexual orientation.
The second argument we often hear is that studies show children
benefit from being raised by married heterosexual parents, and that
8. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, B-275860 (Jan. 31, 1997), available at www.
gao.gov/archive/1997/og97016.pdf.
9. Application for Leave to File Amici Curiae Brief and Amici Curiae Brief of the Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, et al. in Support of Appellant State of California at 2, In re
Marriage Cases, 143 Cal. App. 4th 873 (Ct. App. 2006) (No. 4365).
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children are harmed by being raised in alternative families. In fact,
however, every single one of these studies has looked at single parent
families, divorced families and step-parent families. There is not one
study showing children are harmed in any way by having lesbian or
gay parents. To the contrary, as Mary Cheney recently stated in
response to criticism of her [decision to] have a child with her female
partner, "every piece of remotely responsible research that's been
done the last 20 years on this issue has shown there's no difference
between children raised by same-sex parents and children raised by
opposite-sex parents. What matters is that children are raised in a
stable, loving environment."" That's also the position of the
American Academy of Pediatrics" and literally every single other
mainstream child welfare organization.
Justice Jackson famously noted that "courts can take no better
measure to assure that laws will be just than to require the laws be
equal in operation."' 2 Justice Scalia has agreed, observing that the
constitutional principle of equal protection "requires the democratic
majority to accept for themselves and their loved ones what they
impose on you and me."' 3  We're all here for a very short time.
Nothing we do is more important than forging human bonds, creating
families and passing on love and, hopefully, wisdom to our children.
A person's sexual orientation is utterly irrelevant to being able to
engage in those quintessential human activities. The government
should not discriminate on that arbitrary basis, and it certainly
shouldn't use it to deny anyone the freedom to marry.
Thanks. (Applause.)
KENNETH W. STARR: Thank you, and let me join Shannon and
David, and I'm sure John as well, in expressing my thanks to the
organizers of this discussion on this very important topic, and the
spirit of reasoned conversation that so characterizes the organizations
that have brought us together. My thanks, too, to the judges for
10. Katharine Q. Seelye, Decision to Have Baby Isn't Political, Mary Cheney Says, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 1, 2007, at 20.
11. Comm. on Psychosocial Aspects of Child and Family Health, Am. Acad. of Pediatrics,
Coparent or Second-Parent Adoption by Same-Sex Parents: Committee on Psychosocial Aspects
of Child and Family Health, 109 PEDIATRICS 339, 340 (2002).
12. Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112-13 (1949) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
13. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 300 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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leaving their chambers and courtrooms to be with us for this
conversation.
This is obviously not just a manifestly important issue, but also,
as Shannon has just so eloquently put it, a profoundly human issue.
It's therefore not surprising that people of goodwill are going to
come to contrary views on issues of law and constitutionality, and
thus we find ourselves in litigation. My happy role is serving as co-
counsel to a consortium of very diverse religious organizations. Let
me identify them as they are identified in the amicus brief that was
filed in the California Court of Appeal at the earlier phase, which is
now, as Dean noted, in the California Supreme Court.
Our amicus brief was filed on behalf of the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints, the Catholic Conference of Bishops of
California, the National Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of
America and the National Association of Evangelicals. You'll notice
that some of the organizations are national and others are
Californian, such as the California Council of Bishops of the Roman
Catholic Church.
My points are several. Shannon made a wonderful and powerful
statement that this is not a political issue. This is a policy issue, and
my fundamental submission today is that the issue should be sub-
mitted to "We the people." That is not simply a conservative vision,
but it's also increasingly a vision of our colleagues in the academy
who would eschew the term "conservative." I cite to the witness
stand as recent examples that distinguished Dean of the Stanford
Law School, Larry Kramer, who has talked about the importance of
popular constitutionalism, and who has written eloquently about the
need for the people to regain power over the Constitution. Stephen
Breyer-I can refer to him as Stephen Breyer in his extrajudicial
capacity-in his charming book, Active Liberty,14 which I
recommend to one and all, lifts up the vision of the judiciary,
articulated brilliantly by Learned Hand. Viewed as a judicial con-
servative, Learned Hand in his 1958 Holmes Lectures at the Harvard
Law School stated that no matter how brilliant the judges are-and
we have brilliant judges here-they must be respectful-deeply so-
of the democratic process.
14. STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION
(2005).
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Let me also make the point, as a bookmark, that Learned Hand
was not an originalist.15 It was not his vision that the founding
generation had a particular perspective on certain issues including
the kind of issues that now arrest our attention. Rather it was his
view that we live in a representative democracy and we must take
that seriously. We must be extraordinarily deferential to the people
in community, and that is what Stephen Breyer has said in Active
Liberty. Citing Learned Hand, Justice Breyer said, in effect, "We
must have important issues resolved by the people themselves. It is,
in fact, the very nature of our enterprise to gather to be in
conversation together, but it is likewise the practical and prudential
way to secure agree-ment by the people." 6
Justice Brennan also lifted up the vision that the democratic
conversation would be robust, uninhibited and open-ended-[see]
New York Times v. Sullivan---and two sentences later, Justice
Brennan also said that conversation is frequently going to make us
uncomfortable. But what Justice Brennan and others lifted up and
what Justice Breyer is lifting up-from the perspective of a centrist,
moderate, or however you want to characterize him-is allowing the
conversation to go on. Do not stop the conversation by suggesting
that the Constitution of California, which is extraordinarily populist
in its nature-if there is one overriding theme that we see in the
California Constitution, and people here in this audience know it far
better than I do, but as an outsider returning to California, looking at
the California Constitution-is not deeply concerned about the voice
of the people. The people will be heard, and they will be heard
directly, not through intermediaries and certainly not through
relatively unaccountable intermediaries.
This is a vision that should unite virtually everyone of goodwill
across ideological lines, and I want to place another bookmark before
you. In the Progressive Era, when reform legislation, as it was
viewed at the time, was coming forward-I'm going to say that 102
years ago, in Justice Holmes's dissent in Lochner1" which is not
admired by everyone in the room and I understand that-(laughter) I
15. Doug Linder, Exploring Constitutional Conflicts: Theories of Constitutional Law,
http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/conlaw/interp.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2007).
16. See BREYER, supra note 14, at 15-20.
17. 376 U.S. 967 (1964).
18. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 65 (1905).
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say unabashedly I admire the Holmes dissent because it set forth a
very simple view in those five paragraphs. Manny Klausner, how
many paragraphs? It wasn't that long. I just asked a non-admirer of
the dissent-Justice Holmes said the Constitution was meant for all
of us, and it doesn't yield up answers to the vast majority of
economic and social policy issues, but rather provides a framework
for democratic conversation.
With respect to this specific issue of same-sex marriage, there
are voices-and Dr. Eastman has spoken for these voices of social
scientists-who were saying in the spirit of John Adams and Louis
Brandeis: "Facts, facts, facts. Please let us study this issue. Let us,
as part of the conversation, understand family structures more."
Dean Reuter made a very interesting comment. He talked about the
Family Code. Imagine, if you would, the free speech code. Imagine
the free press code. We recoil at the idea of a code, but go to the
California Family Code. See how elaborate it is, including whom
one can marry. What we do know is there are profound limitations
on state power, and we should be thankful for those limitations,
especially with respect to the idea of invidious discrimination and
seizing and hijacking the marriage relationship in order to achieve
apartheid-type values.
Now the international conversation is underway, and this is my
final point. If a few years ago we'd been talking about capital
punishment for juveniles, we would have been guided by thoughtful
people to the experiences of various other countries, and to the fact
that very few countries allow the death penalty with respect to
juveniles.
Friends, look at the list of countries that have this conversation
actively underway, but have not embraced same-sex marriage. Let's
have the social science. Let's allow the conversation. A very small
minority of countries do in fact allow same-sex marriage. And why
is that? Because thoughtful people are saying this institution, which
has historically been understood to be the union of one man and one
woman, is in fact part of our history and part of our tradition, part of
our culture and before we change it, before we alter it, shouldn't we
know more in terms of social science, in terms of consequences?
Just to set the stage for the fireworks to come, though I'm sure
they will be civil, I leave you provocatively with the very interesting
1218
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study of the American College of Pediatricians, 9 and the concern set
forward by the college with respect to abandoning the institution that
has served societies well across the globe.
Thank you. (Applause.)
DAVID C. CODELL: I'd also like to thank each of the sponsoring
organizations for inviting me to join you here. My colleague
Shannon Minter has already set forth some of the central arguments
that we have [presented] in the California litigation. I want to briefly
introduce a few federal topics and then discuss the relationship of
religion to our topic today.
First, I want to offer a few words about recent efforts to enact
the so-called Federal Marriage Amendment" to the U.S.
Constitution. I think one has to hear the text of the proposed amend-
ment to believe it: "Marriage in the United States shall consist only
of the union of a man and a woman. Neither this Constitution, nor
the constitution of any State, shall be construed to require that mar-
riage or the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon any union other
than the union of a man and a woman." Such an amendment would
be an utter affront to traditional understandings of state sovereignty
and the appropriate balance of federal and state power that is the
hallmark of our federal system. The amendment would prohibit
states from treating their own residents as married couples.
Moreover, it is conceivable, though not definite, that such
language might be construed as prohibiting states through their own
republican institutions or direct democracy from choosing to recog-
nize the marriages of couples within their states. By its terms, the
proposed amendment would mandate to every state court how it is to
interpret its own state constitution and laws.
There is more than a little irony in the proposed amendment's
radical disrespect of state courts. For presumably, some marriage
amendment supporters are those who argue in other contexts-such
as the context of restricting federal court habeas jurisdiction-that
the state courts should be afforded substantial respect in the conduct
of their judicial proceedings, the interpretation of their state laws and
19. Am. Coll. of Pediatricians, Homosexual Parenting: Is It Time for Change?,
http://www.acpeds.org/?CONTEXT=art&cat-10005&art=50&BISKIT=2585322022 (last visited
Apr. 14, 2007).
20. S.J. Res. 40, 108th Cong. (2004).
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the application of federal constitutional principles. The alarming
intrusion into state sovereignty that the Federal Marriage
Amendment would represent should be cause for vigilance, not
simply by those who favor marriage equality for gays and lesbians,
but also by those who believe in limited federal power.
I'll turn now to a federal measure that did manage to become
law by an overwhelming vote of Congress and with the signature of
our nation's first President Clinton. (Laughter.) I'm speaking, of
course, of the so-called federal Defense of Marriage Act. 1 The
federal DOMA has two provisions. One provision purports to
authorize states to ignore the official acts of other states regarding
the marriages of same-sex couples.2 That provision goes so far as to
say that no state shall be required to give effect to any judicial
proceeding of any other state respecting any right arising from a
marriage of a same-sex couple.
There is legitimate debate about what the federal Constitution's
Full Faith and Credit Clause23 requires of the states with respect to
recognizing marriages from other jurisdictions. In my view, the
federal DOMA goes far beyond Congress's authority under the Full
Faith and Credit Clause. That provision begins by stating that the
states shall give full faith and credit to each other's official acts and
merely gives Congress power to prescribe how the official acts,
recordings and proceedings of the states shall be proved and their
effect.
But even were it within Congress's power to enact such a
statute, it is unwise for a federal statute to purport to tell the states
that they are free to go so far as to disregard other states' judicial
rulings. A basic reason that our federal system works is that the
various states credit the official acts of the others. Though each state
is sovereign, all the states are interdependent, and their sovereignty
depends to a certain extent on each state showing basic respect for
the official acts and judicial proceedings of other states. This is so
regardless of whether marriage licenses themselves fall under the
Full Faith and Credit Clause. Judgments of state courts certainly do.
In addition, it cannot be overemphasized how offensive it is for the
21. Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7, 28 U.S.C. §
1738C).
22. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (1996).
23. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
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federal DOMA to single out same-sex couples who are married for
such disfavored treatment under the law.
The second provision of DOMA is a measure that says that in
federal statutes and regulations the word "marriage" means only a
legal union between a man and a woman as husband and wife.24 The
exact meaning of this portion of DOMA is not clear. But I do think
it's clear that it is both unconstitutional and imprudent. First, we
should bear in mind that federal statutes have long deferred to the
states' varying definitions of marriage. Federal statutes generally
accept a state's determination that a couple is married as being
determinative with respect to federal laws that bestow legal
protections on married couples. DOMA is a massive exception.
The federal government, however, has no legitimate reason for
refusing to recognize the marriages of same-sex couples in
Massachusetts while recognizing heterosexual couples in
Massachusetts. Certainly the federal government lacks any legiti-
mate interest in trying to steer gays and lesbians, particularly those
who are already in committed same-sex relationships, into hetero-
sexual marriages instead. Indeed, the government shows marked
disrespect for the institution of marriage by refusing to recognize the
valid marriages of same-sex couples in Massachusetts.
In addition, DOMA runs afoul of the federal Equal Protection
Clause as construed by the U.S. Supreme Court in the Romer v.
Evans 5 case. There are over 1,100 federal statutory protections
associated with marriage. Wholesale disqualification from these
protections of same-sex couples who are validly married reaches too
broadly and plainly reflects impermissible animus against same-sex
couples.
Briefly, I want to address the role of the federal courts and the
federal Constitution with respect to which marriages the states may
or must recognize. There are two salient principles here. First, as
I've already mentioned, it is inconsistent with our highest notions of
federalism for the federal government to prohibit states from
bestowing marital protections on the couples the states wish to deem
married.
24. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (1996).
25. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
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Second, however, it is fully consistent with our federal system
for the Constitution rightly to be regarded as placing restrictions on
forms of discrimination in state family law or intrusions into family
privacy. Some examples: the U.S. Supreme Court has told the states
that they are constitutionally prohibited from banning marriages
between persons of different races. The U.S. Supreme Court has told
the states that the inmates in their prisons must be permitted to
marry. The U.S. Supreme Court has also told the states that they
must permit married couples to use contraception-that is, to choose
not to procreate. In other words, the federal Constitution respects the
states' primary role in family law matters while recognizing that
there are limits on the states' powers and that the Equal Protection
and Due Process Clauses impose particular limits.
Finally, I would like to conclude with some thoughts about the
role of religion in the debate regarding marriage equality. As an
initial matter, it must be remembered that religion does not speak
with one voice on this issue. Though some religions vocally oppose
the marriages of same-sex couples, there are many religious bodies
in America today that consecrate the marriages of same-sex couples
including the United Church of Christ, Reformed Judaism, certain
Buddhist communities, Unitarian Universalists and many others. To
same-sex couples who practice religion within these traditions, the
religious sacrament of marriage is as central to their religious and
social lives as it is to heterosexual couples whose marriages are
recognized by other religions.
For this reason, I take exception to the assertion in a recent brief
filed by my fellow panelist, Dean Starr, on behalf of certain religious
organizations that "religious support for the civil institution of
marriage is possible and given without reservation only because the
legal definition of marriage corresponds to the definition of most
religions.' 26 I also take exception to Dean Starr's assertion in the
same legal brief that "[t]he creation of a gender-neutral definition
would fracture the centuries-old consensus as to the meaning of
marriage and in the process spawn deep tensions between civil and
religious understandings of that institution.
27
26. Application for Leave to File Amici Curiae Brief and Amici Curiae Brief of the Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, et al. in Support of Appellant State of California, supra note
9, at 18.
27. Id.
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The fact of the matter is there is not a religious consensus on the
issue of which civil marriages should be recognized, anymore than
there is a religious consensus on divorce. It should be irrelevant to
the state of California or any other government in this nation whether
most religions believe one thing or another. I suspect there are
numerous activities that the Constitution of California protects that
may be frowned upon by the religions of the majority.
One of the important lessons of the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Lawrence v. Texas" is that moral disapproval of a group
of people, standing alone, is not sufficient to supply a rational basis
for a state law. That is so whether the moral disapproval arises from
religion or from any other source, as the California Council of
Churches recently stated in a "friend of a court" brief here in
California, "commitment to religious liberty for all and equal
protection under the law means that the state may not rely on the
views of particular religious sects as a basis for denying civil
marriage licenses to same-gender couples."29
One nevertheless frequently hears the objection that the state
should not recognize marriages of same-sex couples because it
would somehow infringe on the free exercise of religion by those
whose religions disfavor same-sex relationships. The argument
apparently is that even in civil life, religious people should be
exempt from treating same-sex couples as married. That complaint
has no validity under the law.
A few examples make plain why that is a good thing. Religious
objection to interracial marriages was strong just decades ago and
may still be strong in some circles. In addition, some religions might
find heterosexual divorce as objectionable as the marriage of a same-
sex couple, but California's laws neutrally prohibiting discrimination
based on marital status appropriately apply across the board. If
same-sex couples are permitted to marry, the First Amendment will
protect every religion's right to decide for itself whether to
consecrate such marriages, but the freedom of religion protected by
the First Amendment is not infringed by civil recognition of families
28. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
29. Brief for General Synod of the United Church of Christ, et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents at 22, In re Marriage Cases, 143 Cal. App. 4th 873 (Ct. App. 2006) (No.
4365).
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that fall outside what some religions regard to be the ideal form of
family.
In closing, I'd simply like to say that far from posing any threat
to the institution of marriage, same-sex couples who are seeking the
right to marry wish to partake fully in that institution and indeed to
bolster it. There is no need to defend marriage against such families
and their children, but there is every reason to welcome those
families into marriage.
Thank you. (Applause.)
JoHN EASTMAN: It's the first time I've ever been accused of writing a
Brandeis Brief. (Laughs.) But I guess we did it a bit.
Let me take the issue with a couple of points David made. And
just for clarification, the Federal Marriage Amendment, when it says
no state court shall construe or no state constitution shall be
construed to require same-sex marriage, that doesn't limit the legisla-
tures of the states from adopting same-sex marriage if they choose.
That amendment is designed to foster what Judge Starr, or Dean
Starr, was talking about, that we're going to reach this policy issue
through a deliberative and collaborative process, engaging one with
another to look at the implications. We don't want the courts
deciding it for us as a matter of construing state constitutional
clauses that were never addressed to this particular issue.
I have a slightly different take on the Lochner point Dean Starr
made because I do agree there are some issues where you cannot
simply leave it to the deliberative democratic process. We do have
constitutional protections against majority tyranny. You want to
make sure that majorities through this deliberative process can't
trample fundamental rights, can't seek out discreet and insular
minorities-Carolene Products footnote four ° is full of this idea that
there are protections for individual rights that the courts are supposed
to be there to protect even against willful majorities. The issue for us
is, is this is one of those kind of rights?
I would still disagree with the Supreme Court's opinion in
Lawrence or the Massachusetts decision in Goodridge.3" If they had
said this is a discrete and insular minority and subjected it to strict
30. 304 U.S. 144, 153 (1938).
31. Doyle v. Goodridge, 827 N.E. 2d 1255 (2005).
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scrutiny or had said this is a fundamental right and therefore subject
to strict scrutiny-but neither of those courts did that in either the
context of homosexual sodomy in the Lawrence case or gay marriage
in the Goodridge case. Instead, both purported to apply rational
basis review, the lowest level of scrutiny that the courts give to
legislative judgments. All I have to do to meet rational basis review
is to show there's a legitimate government purpose and that the
restriction is reasonably tied to that purpose. I don't even have to be
right about that. It's actually even more removed than that. Could
the legislature reasonably have thought that its restriction might
further that legitimate governmental purpose? Of course, the answer
to that in both contexts is yes.
There's an extraordinary line in Justice Marshall's opinion in
Goodridge that I think highlights this point better than anything else.
She could conceive of no rational basis for a marriage law that
distinguishes between heterosexual and homosexual couples even
with respect to the procreation and rearing of children. Now, that's
really astounding. The equal protection clause at its core is to
guarantee equal treatment for equal things, not equal treatment for
unequal things or unequal treatment for equal things.
The relative question here for us is: With respect to the
procreation of children, are there any differences between
heterosexual and homosexual couples that the law can recognize?
To say that there are not is to invoke disbelief, it's actually a
dishonest opinion. I would have much greater respect for it if it had
said, "This is strict scrutiny. This is a discrete and insular minority
that, because of historical traditions, because of majoritarian views,
cannot ever prevail in the democratic political process" that Judge
Starr set out. But that's not what those opinions did. It's that
concern about the improper utilization of the judiciary to create a
massive policy shift in this country without deliberation on the
possible ramifications [that is troubling.]
I was at a conference a year and half ago at Brigham Young
where another staunch advocate of gay marriage began by saying,
"What difference does it make to your heterosexual marriage if I
enter into a homosexual marriage?" This kind of libertarian focus on
individual rights as the norm of marriage, the model that we should
support-well, we all understand what difference it makes because
marriage has never been understood in this country as simply a
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matter of fundamental individual right. The reason we have
marriage laws as a foundation of society is that as members of the
society, we all draw benefits from that institution, in procreation and
rearing of children by the two people in the universe who are most
adept at making sure that job gets done right: the natural parents.
That can only exist most readily in a heterosexual marriage by the
natural parents.
The studies that David and Shannon pointed to earlier that say
children do better in heterosexual couples [composed of] their
natural parents; that model doesn't work in any other context. It's
not just stepmother and stepfather, it's not just adoptive parents, it's
anytime there are anything other than the two natural parents.
There's one exception to that, one very close to that is a single
mom-not a single mom who had children out of wedlock and the
father was never part of that-but a single mom whose [husband]
died after the kids were born. That father remained an inspiring
omnipresence in the home. "What would your father think if he
were still here?" Those children end up pretty close to the par of the
heterosexual norm.
They are right. The social science we have on gay couples is
relatively in its infancy. There are some early studies out that, quite
frankly, are politically driven, methodologically flawed and have
been pretty solidly rebutted. But there is no serious study that comes
out one way or another on that question, and therefore it's an open
question, whether there's something about this particular relationship
that might mirror the one history has told us is the norm through all
these times. What are the consequences if we get this wrong, and
why is it so important to listen? We're living through the
consequences of the similar, largely judicially imposed decision of a
generation or two ago.
This professor I mentioned at the BYU conference talked about
how important marriage is and how we have fundamentally changed
it in our history. What he was talking about was the advent of the
no-fault divorce rules in the 1960s and early 1970s, initially driven
by court decisions, subsequently then adopted by legislatures. It's
hard to pinpoint in the social science exactly what the consequences
of those [decisions] were, but the consequences to our society are
pretty severe. The number of out-of-wedlock births, the number of
children in prison or youth facilities, the teenage suicide rates, all of
1226
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these things have skyrocketed-skyrocketed-since those decisions
in the 1960s.
Has any study proved a direct correlation between those two
yet? No. But I think we'd be foolish to think there is not some
connection between that undermining of the fundamental institution
of marriage that for millennia has served as the transmission of
cultural norms, making those things difficult, and the loosening of
those bonds and seeing those things flourish. It's that undermining
of marriage we're talking about. This is not just the people who
support the old model. What we're talking about here is a
fundamental transformation in the notion of marriage, a complete
severing of the marriage idea from that old connection to procreation
and the rearing of children. We're making it an institution across the
board that now means something radically different than it has ever
meant before.
Now, that many not have any consequences for us as a society,
but I think the no-fault divorce model demonstrates to us that in fact
the consequences may be huge and profound, and we as a society
absolutely must engage in a debate before we take this step. I don't
know where we'll end up at the end of that debate. We may well end
up one place and realize 50 years from now we made a grievous
mistake on either side, but it is a policy debate, as Judge Starr
pointed out, that absolutely requires us to utilize the democratic
institutions, not the aristocratic institutions, of our government.
Let me close [with words from] Abraham Lincoln as he dealt
with an issue similar to this: whether we were going to have the
courts take us out of a policy debate in response to Dred Scott. He
said, "The candid citizen must confess that if the policy of the
government upon vital questions affecting the whole people is to be
irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court, the people have
ceased to be their own rulers, having to that extent practically
resigned their government into the hands of that eminent tribunal."32
That's what we're opposed to here. We need to have this debate
civilly on policy grounds before we make one of the most radical
changes in one of the most basic foundation blocks of our society.
Thank you. (Applause.)
32. Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861).
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REUTER: Thank you one and all. We're to that point in the program
where we can take questions from the floor. Let me start off.
One of the themes that seemed to run through several of the
presentations was the question of who decides this issue? At least
three of our speakers talked about that. John you went on to talk
about the tyranny of the majority, I guess alluding to John Stewart
Mill and Tocqueville, and tying in the idea of fundamental rights. I
take it from your discussion that if there's a fundamental right
involved, then the courts can trump the majority. The question then
is who decides? When is there a fundamental right identified, and
how do we get to that point? I'll address that to Professor Eastman
or anyone else on the panel.
EASTMAN: It's a great question, and it's one that divides the two
staunchest conservatives on the court, Justice Scalia and Justice
Thomas. Justice Scalia would look only to define that by our history
and traditions, and the short answer for him would be homosexual
marriage was never part of our history and traditions, therefore it's
not a fundamental right, therefore there's not an issue. I think
Thomas's position would reach the same conclusion, but by a much
different path. He would look to the two sources of how we define
fundamental rights, the same sources I think Jefferson looked to
when he penned the Declaration of Independence. We set out
propositions grounded in nature and nature's God. That's revealed
religion and [the] morality that flows from it-the same kind of
moral principles that flow from our rational thinking.
Nature and nature's God, reason and revelation. Those two
components have both been rejected by the courts in this discussion.
The briefs filed in the Lawrence case and the opinions in the
Lawrence case reject any notion that we can have a moral view about
this that guides what defines fundamental rights, even though it has
been defined that way for centuries, but also rejects the notion of
reason. Saying that we cannot distinguish between heterosexual and
homosexual couples even with respect to the rearing of children is a
proposition that simply ignores basic rational thought.
CODELL: On the question of who decides, we all agree that if there's
a constitutional provision that is violated by a statute, we have
judicial review both under the federal Constitution and under the
1228
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state constitution here in California. In the marriage litigation in
California, we are challenging the marriage statute's exclusion of
same-sex couples on equal protection grounds, privacy grounds and
on a fundamental-right-to-marry ground, as well as some free
expression claims.
In California, the identification of a fundamental right to
privacy, which is in our state constitution, is, as Shannon Minter has
already explained, not based simply on the history of our state-in
other words, not simply on what has always been understood to be a
fundamental right-but instead takes into account changing social
conditions, the real world that we live in. It's simply not the case
under the California Constitution that we are frozen in time at the
enactment of the Constitution here in California.
With respect to the equal protection clause, we have powerful
arguments that the marriage exclusion here in California
discriminates based on sexual orientation and discriminates based on
sex and should therefore be subject to heightened scrutiny by the
California courts. These laws cannot stand simply because there
might be some rational basis for them. Rather, the state must show a
compelling reason and show that these laws are narrowly tailored to
meet that compelling reason.
That said, even under state law in California there has been no
rational basis set forth for this law that can survive even the lowest
level of rational basis review. The California Supreme Court does
not blindly defer to the legislature. Rational review in California has
some bite. You can't simply rely on, for example, moral disapproval
of a group. In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court has made clear that
that's impermissible in Lawrence v. Texas. So there are powerful
arguments [as to] why the courts do have a role to play here.
That said, obviously any measure that has popular support when
it goes into effect is preferable to a measure that the public may not
want, but that point only goes so far. We have to remember that the
ultimate expression of the public will in the state of California is the
California Constitution-the equal protection clause of the California
Constitution, the privacy guarantee and due process guarantee.
Those are expressions of public will. The courts do not impose
anything on the people by accurately interpreting those provisions
and declaring what those provisions mean even if it means striking
down a statute that has wide popular support.
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MINTER: Can I very briefly tack on to that? There's a frustrating
circularity here, because everyone agrees that if there is a serious
constitutional violation presented by excluding same-sex couples
from marriage, that it's appropriate for the court to step in and
resolve that. The disagreement really comes down to whether there
is a serious constitutional violation or not. As David just set forth
here, our view is that there is. I'll relay a helpful comment I heard
Chief Justice Ronald George of the California Supreme Court make
recently in a public forum, that the best definition he's heard of a
judicial activist is a judge issuing a decision that one doesn't like. I
think there's a lot of wisdom in that.
I also wanted to relate it to the Dred Scott point because we've
heard a lot lately from certain conservative quarters trying to link
critiques of substantive due process to the Dred Scott decision. I
wanted to share what I think is a very persuasive passage from
Justice Janice Brown, who's no longer on the California Supreme
Court. She addressed this in a case a few years ago; she noted that
"the true vice of Dred Scott lies not so much in the fact that it treated
prohibition of slavery as nothing less than an assault on the concept
of property"-substantive due process concept-"but rather [that] a
majority of the United States Supreme Court endorsed the then-
prevailing societal view that African-Americans had no rights the
white man was bound to respect."33
The true lesson of Dred Scott is we should be very cautious
about assuming that another group of people doesn't fully share basic
human attributes such as the ability to procreate and raise children.
Frankly it's painful to hear the suggestion that it should be shocking
that anyone would suggest that same-sex couples and heterosexual
couples are similarly situated in that respect. Obviously we believe
they are, and the California legislature also has gone on record as
firmly believing in standing for the proposition that same-sex
couples exist in this state and that their families ought to have equal
protection.
STARR: May I briefly comment? I would simply cite the Supreme
Court's decisions 10 years ago in the end-of-life cases coming out of
Washington and New York. The courts, through different
33. Hi-Voltage Wire Works, Inc. v. City of San Jose, 12 P.3d 1068, 1073 (Cal. 2000).
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interpretative methodologies embedded and embodied in the various
opinions, came to the unanimous view that the Constitution simply
did not yield up an answer with respect to the state's interference
with the determination to end one's life. Talk about a fundamental
liberty interest: [that case involves] pain and suffering and perhaps
great expense to the family. The powerful moral case can be made,
and it's been successfully made in various countries around the
world. It's certainly been made successfully in Oregon, and it
continues to be a very lively issue here in California.
But in the Supreme Court-and it's essentially the same
Supreme Court ideologically-the moderates and those who some
might view as to the left of the moderates were all of one accord, that
the Constitution should protect the marketplace of ideas so we can
debate these policy issues. Of course, you have a fundamental
interest in the state not laying its hands upon your body, but the state
does have a profound interest in life and the sanctity of life. The
courts simply said at the end of the day-when one reads
Washington v. Glucksburg,34 again very different interpretative
methodologies, but all nine justices of the court then sitting said,
"Allow the democratic conversation to go on." They were
foreshadowing Justice Breyer's vision of the active liberty of the
democratic conversation.
Now, this is more in the nature of a rebuttal. It is very valuable
that we lift up, as our colleagues on the other side of the issue have,
the values of federalism. This is a very good thing, concerns about
DOMA and so forth treading on federalism values.
But federalism of course is simply another structural principle in
favor of self government, and surely the idea that states should be
able to experiment does in fact mean that Oregon should be able to
go its own way, and Washington State or California or Nevada
should be able to go their own ways. But the fundamental issue that
I think both John and I would leave before everyone is the
Constitution simply does not yield up an answer to this particular
question, and that's what our very able colleagues are very skillfully
arguing to the California Supreme Court. Yes, the answer has been
there all along.
34. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
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Final point, the Defense of Marriage Act can be criticized on
policy grounds-we've heard that here-it can criticized on
constitutional grounds-the Full Faith and Credit Clause-but surely
that goes to the final point that was just made by John, with respect
to rationality. The Congress of the United States overwhelmingly
enacted the Defense of Marriage Act, section 2 of which defines
marriage in the traditional way, and it was signed in the law by
President William Jefferson Clinton.
REUTER: Let's go to questions from the floor. I will give you the
opportunity to identify yourself and your affiliation if you want, and
we'll start over here with Manny Klausner.
KLAUSNER: Thank you. I'm chairman of the Libertarian Law
Council and the founder of the Reason Foundation. John alluded to
one of his opponents at BYU giving a libertarian view on the subject,
and I would say that as a libertarian it's clear that on the policy
issues, libertarians are divided. Minter said that, as I understood his
remarks, civil unions don't go far enough. I'd like to hear some
elucidation from any of the panelists as to why civil unions are not a
sufficient approach in terms of the policy debate.
MINTER: They don't offer in a purely practical sense anything
approaching actual equality. Civil unions don't give same-sex
couples the ability to seek any of the more than 1,100 federal rights
and protections that are tied to marriage. Civil unions don't have the
kind of portability we associate with marriage. Especially nowadays
when people travel and move often, it leaves people in a very
vulnerable condition. Perhaps more fundamentally, there simply
isn't a rational basis to try and create out of whole cloth a new
separate legal status for same-sex couples simply because they're
same-sex couples.
If we look at why marriage is a protected right-the way the
California Supreme Court and the U.S. Supreme Court has
approached the question, of how to determine whether a particular
claimant has a right to participate in a right that's previously been
established as fundamental-you look at the attributes of that
established right and then you ask the question, "Is there something
about this particular group of people that disqualifies them from
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being able to participate and benefit from those attributes?" When it
comes to marriage: no. We know from a number of cases, most
importantly Turner v. Safley35 the U.S. Supreme Court has told us
what they think are the essential attributes of marriage that entitle it
to be protected as a constitutional right. That has to do with an
expression of commitment between two people, an acknowledgment
that marriage has a spiritual significance for a lot of people and an
acknowledgment that marriage is the gateway to a number of
protections and benefits.
There's just nothing about gay and lesbian people or being in a
same-sex relationship that disqualifies anyone from being able to
participate in and benefit from all of those attributes. We think at the
end of the day it is irrational and invidious to try to create out of
whole cloth a whole new separate legal status for lesbian and gay
people solely in order to maintain a distinction between gay and
straight people. That's not the way our constitutional system is
supposed to work.
CODELL: Could I just add that when the state of California sets up
two systems of family law, marriage and domestic partnership, and
says to gay couples, "you go over here," and says to heterosexual
couples, "you go over here," the state of California is saying to our
friends, our neighbors, our family, our government actors, that sexual
orientation is a valid basis for distinguishing between people and for
distinguishing between families. Actually, sexual orientation is not a
valid basis for distinguishing between families or people, and it's
actually contrary to California public policy as it has been developed
by the California legislature over the last 10 years and as the courts
have recognized. It is a form of invidious discrimination for the state
to divide families based on a characteristic, sexual orientation, that
plays no role in one's ability to contribute to society and that plays
no role in one's ability to have strong, lasting family relationships.
WILLIAM BECKER: I'm proud to be co-council with Manny Klausner
and John Eastman on a religious liberties case. My question's for the
conservative side. I wonder if you could deliver your oral argument
on the equal protection argument, which I really haven't heard from
35. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
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the conservatives yet, and also contrast that with the slippery slope
argument.
STARR: I think John did. I heard him discuss the rational basis test.
The traditional form of marriage has been embedded in our laws for
literally millennia and has been ratified by the people because of
concerns about the integrity of the family unit and the welfare of
children. One may disagree with that, but the family codes are quite
elaborate with respect to the responsibilities of spouses, one to
another, and to the rearing of children and certain assumptions that
flow with respect to whose child this is. This very elaborate body of
law is all built upon a single edifice and that is the traditional
definition of marriage. That certainly goes, it seems to me, to the
rational basis that this is a traditional institution since time out of
mind that has been viewed in one particular way, with the welfare of
children very much in mind.
It doesn't mean you shouldn't have a discussion about whether
children are equally or better protected in other kinds of
relationships. The conversation obviously remains open. You just
heard the argument that with respect to strict scrutiny. The courts
simply have not been willing in any of the cases to say that sexual
orientation is in fact a ground for triggering strict scrutiny. Why is
that? This has been part of the dialogue as well. Various statutes,
including federal civil rights laws, do not reach so far. And why is
that? Because there's a history and a tradition. That history and
tradition may change, but it's difficult then to advance the view that
this is a fundamental liberty interest in light of the history and
tradition that informs this elaborate body of law.
EASTMAN: Let me add to that. Social science literature, just on the
heterosexual side, shows, at a statistically significant level, that the
children of two natural parents end up having fewer problems than
the children of one natural parent and another stepfather or
stepmother. Therefore, under traditional rational basis review, it
seems to me perfectly rational and legitimate for a legislature to say
that the two natural parent phenomenon has something to do with the
most effective rearing of children that we've seen in human history.
It's not irrational to think that, therefore, if I get into a relationship
that by definition does not have two natural parents rearing that child
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that those children may be at a disadvantage. That's not irrational
under our traditional rational basis review.
The reason the courts don't want to take it to strict scrutiny and
define this as a fundamental right-think about what flows if you
define either sexual orientation as a suspect class: why limit it to two
homosexual persons? Sexual orientation has lots of variations. If
it's a suspect class, all of those variations also get strict scrutiny. If
you instead look at fundamental rights as the way to get to strict
scrutiny-Fundamental right to marry has never been the definition
for fundamental right; it's been the fundamental right to marry as
we've defined marriage.
As I start treating it more broadly than that, as a broader
fundamental right to marry whomever I wish, then all of the laws on
incest, adult consensual-let's take other things off the table-fall by
the [wayside] because they're intrusions on fundamental rights that
arguably don't meet compelling interest with, that are narrowly
tailored. The laws against plural marriages all fall because they
don't meet that same standard as well. I think it's for that reason
Justice Kennedy claimed to be applying only rational basis review in
Lawrence, while Justice Marshall in the Massachusetts Goodridge
decision absolutely refused to take this to strict scrutiny. The
ramifications of that decision are profound, but to pretend that this
doesn't meet our traditional notions of rational basis review is just
dishonest.
JEFF JACOBBERGER: First, a comment. I was raised as a Christian
and read all about polygamy in the Old Testament, and my last
boyfriend was a Mormon, so I know something about-(laughter)-
the Latter-day Saints. For you to state that for millennia we've
understood marriage to be between one man and one woman is
simply a historical lie. Actually, I appreciate your comments, Judge
Starr, about representative democracy. In the state of California we
had a political process that started with the very weak domestic
partnership law [that] has gradually been strengthened. We got a
marriage law through the General Assembly and off to the
legislature, though vetoed by the governor. Perhaps California might
be a place where the political process is working.
My question for you, on the conservative side of the issue, is
with respect to the Federal Marriage Amendment, where there is an
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attempt to lock in what you hope is two-thirds of Congress and three-
quarters of the states in favor of the amendment-is it an effort to
keep the political process from working? Because it means that
those who favor gay marriage have to wait until we get two-thirds of
Congress and three-quarters of the states. I'd like your response to
that comment.
STARR: Yes. I'm not in favor of a constitutional amendment. I tend
to disfavor adjusting the Constitution, even for strongly held reasons,
so I for one don't embrace it. One of the reasons I don't is that
marriage and family issues have historically been entrusted to the
states, and for pro-federalism reasons I get worried when the federal
government sees fit to intrude-and I see it as an intrusion-into this
traditional arena of state authority. On that I think there's likely to
be a fair amount of agreement among all of the panelists and
certainly a lot of people with whom I've chatted who feel strongly
that this is a matter for democratic debate and resolution.
You rightly point out that the democratic conversation in
California has moved very far along, including the passage through
the General Assembly and the governor's veto. One of the intriguing
and, I suppose, ironic dimensions is that the issue is in the courts.
(Laughter.) It shouldn't be in the courts, in my view, it should be in
Sacramento in the Assembly halls. Let's allow the Assembly to
work its will and the governor to face this issue on its merits. I am
very sensitive to federalism values and the ability of the various
states, including if California goes that way, to go the way the people
of that state feel through the democratic conversation it should go.
EASTMAN: Let me take the other view, [and play] the devil's
advocate on this. One of the problems with the state-by-state
experimenting model is that it's not limited to a single state. Couples
from 46 different states secured marriage licenses in Massachusetts
shortly after the Goodridge decision. They didn't stay in Massachu-
setts. They went back to their states, and there's a panoply of
litigations over: "Will the state recognize our divorce if we split up
when they didn't recognize the marriage?" What are the intestate
succession rules that apply?
Massachusetts's decision or California's decision is going to
have profound impacts in other states as people move there. It's that
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challenge to the public policy decisions of those states that is
undermined and is part of the driving force behind the Federal
Marriage Amendment. The nature of the question becomes such that
you cannot have it state by state. I think that's part of what's driving
the people: the transportability of the California judgment. Imposing
it on Tennessee, when the people of Tennessee might have had a
counter judgment, that is driving part of the Federal Marriage
Amendment discussion.
CODELL: Family law has varied dramatically among the states for the
entire history of our nation; divorce laws used to be radically
different; there were differences in adoption laws. The states have
worked it out; the state courts have worked it out; the state
legislatures have worked it out. There is no reason to enact a federal
amendment saying that no state in this country can permit same-sex
couples that live within those states from marrying. Furthermore,
when a same-sex couple that lives in Mississippi marries in
California and goes back to Mississippi, I'd be hard pressed to
understand what kind of public policy in the state of Mississippi is
really being damaged by that marriage, but I'm sure we're going to
disagree on that.
STARR: Just one footnote, and this is definitely three cheers for
federalism. A number of states are in conversation with respect to
different tiers called the multi-tiered marriages, covenant marriages.
It began in Louisiana and was quickly adopted in Arizona and
Arkansas and is now under consideration in some 29 states. It's a
very interesting idea. Stronger entry requirements, stronger exit
requirements. New York State has a very rich history of essentially
delegating the question of certain marriage issues to rabbinical
courts-some interesting constitutional establishment clause issues
there. But through the democratic process the state-and this is true
in most nations-does not seize monopolistic authority over the
definition of marriage, but rather allows religious communities and
other communities to speak to this issue. One thing we have not
talked about at all is should we encourage the federalism
experiments, the laboratory of the states, so we can experiment with
the idea of multi-tiered marriages?
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UNIDENTIFIED QUESTIONER: There's been discussion of popular
sovereignty, and I remember living through the Proposition 22
debates. 6 We debated all this and the people spoke, and yet you say
that popular sovereignty is not to be respected, and you challenge it
in court. I wonder if the people at that time had done it right and
made a constitutional amendment out of it, if you'd still be here,
because I think you're litigating constitutional amendments that were
passed by other states, some 15 states now that have constitutional
amendments prescribing marriages [as] the marriage of a man and a
woman. You're involving litigation there, which to me demonstrates
a certain disingenuousness about this reference to popular
sovereignty.
CODELL: I'm not sure there is any state litigation in states with con-
stitutional amendments. I don't believe there are any federal cases-
MINTER: There was the case arising out of the Nebraska amendment
that has now been resolved. The Eighth Circuit rejected the
challenge to the constitutionality of Nebraska's constitutional
amendment.
REUTER: Lets ask the question this way: If Proposition 22 were a
constitutional amendment, would you be here today behind this case?
I think that's the gist of the question, isn't it?
STARR: Of course you would. (Laughter.)
CODELL: Would we be in state court, purely on state constitutional
grounds if there were a constitutional amendment banning it? I think
it would depend on how broadly that proposition purported to go.
Any kind of proposition that would try to seal out gay and lesbian
couples from state protections across the board would be subject to
challenge. If the measure were simply applied to marriage as a
constitutional amendment, you'd have a hard time winning in the
state courts on state constitutional grounds.
36. Rona Marech, The Battle over Same-Sex Marriage, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 20, 2004, at B4.
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REUTER: Let me ask the question on this side. If things come out
differently in the political process, are you going to be as sanguine
about who decides?
STARR: I am. I think John has expressed concerns. (Laughter.) I'm
willing to allow the conversation to unfold in the various states, and
what happens happens. It's one of the reasons I was quite distressed
to see the Justice Department attack Oregon's medical marijuana
law. I felt that was a very poor use--(applause)--of judgment and a
very poor interpretation. I realized some very respected justices
completely disagree with me, and so I may very well be in error, but
that's the pro-federalism in a lot of us that says, "We're willing to
live with the results of the democratic conversation, but our plea is to
allow that conversation to unfold." You will end up having a much
happier and healthier polity if you do it that way. So this is a plea, a
cry of the heart, that we're doing that in the end-of-life issues, we're
having that kind of conversation, but look at the rancor and acrimony
that is for ever with us because of Roe v. Wade.
EASTMAN: I take the same position. I tried to draw that distinction in
the no-fault divorce case: I criticized those states that did that by
judicial fiat, and I thought they were foolish, but defended their right
to be foolish. Similarly, in the brief we filed in the Supreme Court's
medical marijuana case, I defended the ability of California to make
a foolish decision. It's not a part of the federal Commerce Clause
authority. One of the things you have to recognize when you allow
things to be subjected to the deliberative process in a democracy is
sometimes the majority gets it wrong, but then the majority has to
suffer the consequences of its own mistake, and it is also in a
position to correct its mistake. When it's imposed upon you by a
court, no majority can correct that mistake and that's the problem of
doing this by judicial fiat.
CODELL: Except that we have the courts to correct mistakes. That's
part of the reason we have judicial review: so if the people make a
mistake, the courts can correct it.
TERRY STEVENSON: I just want to thank all of you for this wonderful
program. I agree with Professor Eastman that the courts are
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extremely disingenuous using the rational basis test when strict
scrutiny should be the test. But in California under the Fair
Employment and Housing Act,37 sexual orientation is a suspect
classification. Hasn't the horse already left the barn on that one in
California?
EASTMAN: The fact that it's a suspect classification by virtue of
statute does not override the other statutory provisions, including
Proposition 22, which don't treat it as such. If you were to have that
suspect classification imposed as a constitutional matter, then I
would agree.
CODELL: The Legislature has made quite clear that the public policy
of the state of California is that discrimination based on sexual
orientation is improper by any branch of the government or any
program that receives government funds. The Legislature has
spoken clearly about what the state's public policy is. If you apply
the factors that the California Supreme Court has announced for what
constitutes a suspect classification, including a history of discrim-
ination, including irrelevance to one's ability to contribute to society,
then I think sexual orientation easily falls within the categories that
the courts have to subject to heightened scrutiny. That means that
the courts should presume that any law that discriminates based on
sexual orientation is invalid because what valid basis is there for
discriminating against people based on their sexual orientation? The
Legislature has said none, and it said that with respect to almost
every aspect of public life. I think the Legislature has it right, and I
look forward to the day the California Supreme Court agrees.
STARR: But, with all respect, the legislature has not said it with
respect to the issue that brings us together. There is a huge
transportation issue of bringing that determination with respect to
one set of issues, such as housing and housing discrimination, and
saying, "Here is that same principle with respect to the definition of
marriage." I don't think fairness has been given in terms of our
treatment of the California Court of Appeal, the intermediate court's
decision in this case, and I do commend the two opinions, including
37. CAL. GOv'T CODE §§ 12900-12906 (West 2007).
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the very impassioned, very powerful dissenting opinion. But I want
to lift up the majority's opinion in this context, since it goes to the
specific question. The majority's opinion looked very carefully and,
I think, quite respectfully to the conversation that has been underway
in the General Assembly and elsewhere, seeing the march in favor of
sensitivity and protection of gay and lesbian individual liberty
interests and their interest in having particular kinds of protected
relationships.
Our colleagues on the other sides say that's not enough. Manny
Klausner asked the question of why is that not enough. But the point
that was before and that persuaded a majority of the judges on the
California Court of Appeal is that one needs to look holistically at
not simply the history and tradition but also at the entire march of
what the legislature has done. What the legislature had come up with
at this time and place in our history is essentially a balanced
approach that easily passes the rational basis test.
EASTMAN: I don't think you can look only at the subordinate
legislative authority in this state, the Legislature. The ultimate
legislative authority in this state, the people, actually had the
legislative pronouncement about this as well and that prevails over
the subordinate legislative judgments. Proposition 22 is the law of
the land-unless it violates directly a provision of the state
constitution, [which] they're arguing that it does. But they have to
concede that it violates those provisions only by giving them an
interpretation that has never existed in our history before.
UNIDENTIFIED QUESTIONER: My question goes to the question of
rational basis. We heard, Dr. Eastman, that you looked at the social
science behind raising children as a rational basis for treating lesbian
and gay people who want to marry differently from heterosexual
people. But given that, as has been described, lesbian and gay
people live in committed relationships, do have children and are
raising them and that there are civil unions that are recognized by the
state-and that the state recognizes the marriages of people who are
step parenting and the other non-socially science validated ways of
raising children. Given that those things are both the case, is there
any other reason then, besides the sexual orientation of the people,
that would create such rational basis? Isn't that the argument for
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why leaving the discussion open to the majority when it's just the
difference between the two sexual orientations-Is there a rational
basis or is there a harm to marriage from just that?
ALLISON MILLER: I am the president of the new Pepperdine Chapter
of the American Constitution Society. Dean Starr, you had discussed
the democratic discourse leading to a "happier" policy. I think I
understand what you meant by that, but my question for you is, how
do you address that in terms of Massachusetts, where, I believe,
public sentiment towards gay marriage actually increased after they
allowed gay marriage not by the democratic process.
The second question relates to children. Given the number of
children being raised in gay and lesbian relationships, what would
your comments, Professor Eastman, be about protecting that family
and those children while still arguing that it would not be a protec-
tion of the family and the children to allow gay marriage?
DIANE GOODMAN: I'm president of the Academy of California
Adoption Lawyers. Judge Starr, you talked a lot about the Family
Code and its provisions relating to the conduct [in] the heterosexual
family unit. But the Uniform Parentage Act,38 which is in the Family
Code, talks specifically about finding other types of parents. The
California Supreme Court in at least four decisions in the last few
years has ruled that you can have two parents of the same gender or
two different-gender parents who aren't married. Why is the issue of
parentage even relevant to the discussion of who should be allowed
to be married?
MICHAEL TANENBAUM: I'm a lawyer here in California and a law
professor in Europe. I have an empirical question, and I guess it
goes more to the gay marriage advocates. I heard it said a couple of
times that there are 1,100 benefits to marriage under the law. I'm a
single guy, not yet married yet. I didn't know it was such a good
deal. (Laughter.) I'm wondering if you could help me understand
what some of those us are, or how I get a catalogues of those, and
also which of those are unavailable to people who would otherwise
just arrange their affairs by private contract?
38. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 7600-7606 (West 2007).
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STARR: Let me just say to my wonderful Pepperdine colleague-and
I call my students colleagues because we're studying all this
together-that, yes, I think it is happier. What I mean by that term is
it's healthier in a democratic society, regardless of the opinion polls,
which may wax and may wane. I just cited, again, the nation's
excruciating and continuing experience with the abortion contro-
versy, and the sad and poignant call by the plurality in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey,39 now 15 years ago, to stop the debate. The
Court has spoken, so there are certain issues that the Court should
just take off the table, and we've now taken abortion off the table.
But no, they haven't. They haven't even taken it off the table
with the Congress of the United States, with duly elected presidents
of the United States. Especially for the students here who have
grown up in a culture that looks to the courts for succor or
constitutional interpretation, Marbury v. Madison4" and so forth, I
would say take a page again from Holmes and the tradition Holmes
began articulating, carried on through Brandeis, through Cardozo,
through John Harlan the second-Harlan the first as well-
Frankfurter, Byron White, Learned Hand, Henry Friendly, I could go
on. These are numerous judges, appointed by presidents of different
parties, who have lifted up the vision that we have a fundamental
right in this country and that's the right to govern ourselves.
Of course there are limits, and Dr. Eastman rightly pointed to
those limits. But let's have that discussion, let's have that debate and
if the polls in Massachusetts are running in favor of same-sex
marriage, that's fine. But look what happened: by virtue of the
Goodridge decision, many states rose up in righteous indignation and
amended their constitutions. I have heard some pundits from the
Democratic Party say that if it weren't for Chief Justice Marshall's
opinion in Goodridge, John Kerry would have been elected. It was
that serious of a political issue. Many people went to the polls in
2000 feeling very strongly-rightly or wrongly-about this issue.
Why? They wanted to be heard, and they insisted on being heard.
EASTMAN: Let me take up the [question of the] 1,100 [benefits]. I
know a lot of people in marriages who will say on some days, every
39. 510 U.S. 1309 (1994)
40. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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one of those 1,100 benefits is barely enough. (Laughter.) Let me
take up the serious question. The Uniform Parentage Act is the way
I'll tee off the two questions. The fact that California policy has
recognized that it's better for kids to be reared in any committed
relationship, rather than being raised in a foster home or in an
orphanage, is a compassionate response to a serious problem we
have in this country. That doesn't mean that as a matter of policy
California has said there is no difference between any of those
secondary options or backup options and the primary option that
Proposition 22 recognizes.
As far as rational basis review on those questions, the legislature
doesn't even have to be right about its assessment on whether this is
what the social science [says]-all they have to do is have a
reasonable ground for making that classification. I don't think you
can legitimately look at the history of marriage, with the social
science evidence that we do have, and say that it is so far off the
table that it's just completely irrational to think that perpetuating
traditional marriage might reasonably help foster the institution that
we've known for thousands of years.
CODELL: I don't think rational basis is that light. I don't think that
the government has a legitimate interest in anything that is based on
bias or prejudice, and the fact that one might have suspicions that
one group of people might be better at something than another I
don't think necessarily provides a rational basis for it.
If you listen carefully to the arguments that have been made on
the other side today, it said that the best family to raise a child in is
with the natural mother and a natural father. I find that adoption is a
wonderful thing, and single parents who are raising their children are
a wonderful thing, and I don't think the state has an interest in
enforcing and steering people into one particular kind of family, even
if it might be optimal. The state is not in the business of requiring
optimal parents for children. I'm sure there are all sorts of criteria
we could set up as to this kind of parent is better than that kind of
parent, but the state doesn't go around either taking children out of
homes-unless there's a severe problem-or declaring who can get
married based on whether we would want them to have children
together.
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MINTER: I'm glad we're ending on this issue because I think it is the
most critical issue. I want to note that there is actually no serious
scientific dispute at all-sexual orientation is completely irrelevant
to a person's ability to parent. That position has been adopted by
American Academy of Pediatrics, Child Welfare League of America,
both of the APAs, the National Association of Social Workers.
There really is no scholarly dispute about that. (Applause.)
Another related, important point and one we haven't mentioned
today is that the state of California, partly for that reason and partly
for another reason I'll address in a moment, has not advanced any
arguments relating to the welfare of children in the marriage case. In
fact, they have specifically renounced those arguments and said that
they are unable to say that any part of the reason for excluding same-
sex couples from marriage has anything to do with the welfare of
children in California. The reason they can't say that in California
was alluded to by Diane Goodman: it's because both the legislature
and the courts here have made it as absolutely crystal clear as they
possibly could, that it is the public policy of this state that children of
same-sex parents are entitled to all the same protections as children
of heterosexual parents and that sexual orientation and gender are
completely irrelevant to a person's parental abilities.
What's so extraordinary about the Court of Appeal decision, and
such a departure from our constitutional traditions, is the court
actually said that even though the state is acknowledging that these
two groups of people are similarly situated for purposes of the
marriage statute, that the state can rationally maintain an exclusion of
same-sex couples from marriage simply in order to accommodate the
majority's desire to maintain a privileged legal status for itself.
I don't think that is consistent with a precedent in this state or at
the federal level, and I am hopeful that the California Supreme Court
will agree with us on that and will reverse the Court of Appeal for
that reason.
EASTMAN: I just want to respond to that because I think there's some
confusion when we shift the terms of the debate of the social science
research that is there. I never said that I didn't think people of
certain sexual orientation are not capable of rearing children or doing
it well. What I did say is the social science evidence tells us that the
most successful way of raising children is in low-conflict marriages
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of two biological parents, and they've made that [observation] in
comparison to single-parent families, children born to unmarried
mothers, and children in step families or cohabiting relationships. In
every one of those cases, the social science evidence is pretty pro-
found that the children in those relationships face higher risks of
poor outcomes than the children in low-conflict marriages that have
two biological parents.
Now, the studies are much too recent on whether those studies
translate so that stable gay relationships should be treated as bio-
logical relationships or as step-relationships, but to take that social
science literature and say there's absolutely no rational basis for
making the judgment that maybe the biological parent connection is
what's most relevant in producing the most optimal situation for
raising children, I think it's just not sustainable, certainly not under
the way we traditionally approach rational basis review.
REUTER: Please join me in thanking the panelists. This was terrific.
(Applause.)
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